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Richard A. Leo* and Jon B. Gould**
There has been an explosion of legal scholarship on wrongful
convictions in the last decade, reflecting a growing concern about the
problem of actual innocence in the criminal justice system. Yet criminal
law and procedure scholars have engaged in relatively little dialogue or
collaboration on this topic with criminologists. In this article, we use the
empirical study of wrongful convictions to illustrate what criminological
approaches-or, more broadly, social science methods-can teach legal
scholars. After briefly examining the history of wrongful conviction
scholarship, we discuss the limits of the (primarily) narrative
methodology of legal scholarship on wrongful convictions. We argue
that social scientific methods allow for more precise and accurate
depictions of the multifactorial and complex nature of causation in
wrongful conviction cases. In the main body of this article, we discuss
and illustrate several social science approaches to the study of wrongful
conviction: aggregated case studies, matched comparison samples, and
path analysis. We argue these methods would help criminal law and
procedure scholars to better understand the causes, characteristics, and
consequences of wrongful convictions than a purely narrative approach.
Finally, we offer concluding thoughts about improving the dialogue
between criminal law and criminology on the subject of wrongful
conviction.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the last twenty years, the media have reported numerous cases in which
people who had been wrongly convicted of rape and murder years earlier were
exonerated and released from prison.' Many of these exonerations occurred after
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1 See generally Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States 1989 Through
2003, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523 (2005).
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post-conviction DNA testing established the innocence of the defendants.2 In
some of these cases-such as the Central Park jogger case in New York City-
DNA evidence established the innocence of multiple defendants who had been
erroneously prosecuted, convicted, and incarcerated years earlier.3 In other cases,
innocent individuals were released from prison after serving many years on death
row.
4 To date, more than 230 prisoners have been exonerated by post-conviction
DNA testing,5 and there appears to be no end to this trend.6 An increasing number
of wrongly convicted prisoners also have established their innocence through non-
DNA means of exoneration in the last twenty years.7
The exoneration of hundreds of wrongfully convicted but factually innocent
prisoners has challenged some of our most fundamental assumptions about
American criminal justice and procedure. Prior to 1989, the first year that post-
conviction DNA testing was used to establish innocence, 8 virtually all observers
assumed that the innocent were rarely convicted, 9 if at all, especially in capital
cases. l Since 1989, however, there has been a growing recognition in popular
culture and among criminal justice professionals that wrongful convictions occur
regularly in the American criminal justice system." In American society, the
arrival of DNA testing and the jump in factually indisputable exonerations has put
the problem of wrongful conviction on the national agenda and led to a drop in
public confidence about the criminal justice system.12
2 The Innocence Project in New York documents all post-conviction DNA exonerations. See
generally Innocence Project, http://www.innocenceproject.org (last visited Sept. 7, 2009).
3 Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in the Post-DNA
World, 82 N.C.L. REv. 891,894-900 (2004).
4 See generally STANLEY COHEN, THE WRONG MEN: AMERICA'S EPIDEMIC OF WRONGFUL
DEATH Row CONVICTIONS (2003). See also LESLIE LYTLE, EXECUTION'S DOORSTEP: TRUE STORIES OF
THE INNOCENT AND NEAR DAMNED (2008).
5 Innocence Project, Case Profiles, http://www.innocenceproject.org/know/ (last visited Apr.
4, 2009).
6 See Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 121-31 (2008).
7 See Gross et al., supra note 1, at 527.
8 BARRY SCHECK ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION AND OTHER
DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED 65 (2000).
9 Garrett, supra note 6, at 56 ("Actors in the criminal system long doubted whether courts
ever wrongly convicted people .... ").
10 Id., at 56-57; see also Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in
Potentially Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L. REV. 21 (1987).
"l Garrett, supra note 6, at 57 ("Exoneration cases have altered the ways judges, lawyers,
legislators, the public, and scholars perceive the criminal system's accuracy.").
12 See generally JON B. GOULD, THE INNOCENCE COMMISSION: PREVENTING WRONGFUL
CONVICTIONS AND RESTORING THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (2008). See also FRANK R.
BAUMGARTNER ET AL., THE DECLINE OF THE DEATH PENALTY AND THE DISCOVERY OF INNOCENCE
(2008).
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The DNA exonerations have given rise to an "innocence movement" 13 in
American law, seen by some as "the civil rights movement of the twenty-first
century.1 4 Although this is surely an overstatement, at various law schools across
the United States there are now almost fifty non-profit innocence projects whose
purpose is to investigate and litigate post-conviction claims of innocence as well as
to propose reforms.' 5 In addition, six states have created innocence commissions,
1 6
and more than forty state legislatures have passed statutes to facilitate inmate
access to biological evidence for post-conviction DNA testing. Many states have
even implemented legislation to address the underlying sources of wrongful
conviction.17 In 2004, the United States Congress passed the Innocence Protection
Act, which provides funding for state post-conviction DNA testing and raises the
annual compensation for exonerated federal prisoners.' 8 Although the precise rate
of wrongful convictions remains unknown,' 9 there is now a growing awareness in
the legal system that erroneous convictions occur more frequently than almost
anyone had previously thought .2  Speaking only of wrongful conviction in capital
cases, Justice Souter recently reflected this sentiment when he wrote that they
happen "in numbers never imagined before the development of DNA tests. 21
The post-conviction DNA and non-DNA exonerations of hundreds of
innocent prisoners in the last two decades have also had an effect on academic
scholarship, generating a virtual explosion of academic writing on wrongful
convictions.22 Strikingly, most of this scholarship has occurred in law reviews, not
in peer reviewed social science and criminology journals. In the last decade, law
professors and legal scholars have written extensively about the legal causes and
consequences of wrongful conviction, as well as about legal and policy reforms
designed to reduce their occurrence. Numerous law reviews have published
symposia on the problem of wrongful convictions.2 3 Beyond the large quantity of
legal scholarship, there has also been a sense that a new paradigm may be
13 See generally Marvin Zalman, Criminal Justice System Reform and Wrongful Conviction,
17 CRIM. JUST. POL'Y REv. 468 (2006).
'4 Daniel S. Medwed, Innocentrism, 2008 U. ILL. L. REv. 1549, 1550.
15 See generally Keith A. Findley, The Pedagogy of Innocence: Reflections on the Role of
Innocence Projects in Clinical Legal Education, 13 CLINICAL L. REv. 231 (2006).
16 See generally GOULD, supra note 12.
17 Medwed, supra note 14, at 1549-50.
18 Innocence Protection Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-405, § 411, 118 Stat. 2278, 2278-80
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3600 (Supp. 2004)).
19 See Bedau & Radelet, supra note 10, at 23.
20 See generally GOULD, supra note 12; see also BAUMGARTNER ET AL., supra note 12.
21 Kansas v. Marsh, 126 S. Ct. 2516, 2544 (2006) (Souter, J., dissenting).
22 See generally Richard A. Leo, Rethinking the Study of Miscarriages of Justice: Developing
a Criminology of Wrongful Conviction, 21 J. CoNTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 201 (2005).
23 See, e.g., Symposium, Wrongful Convictions Symposium, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 587 (2004);
Symposium, Beyond Biology: Wrongful Convictions in the Post-DNA World, 2008 UTAH L. REv. 1.
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emerging, one that treats accuracy and reliability as on par with or even more
important than traditional concerns about procedural due process.2 4 Daniel
Medwed has coined the term "innocentrism" to connote the emerging centrality of
innocence-based arguments and scholarship in criminal law and procedure. Yet
for all the attention that academe has given to wrongful convictions, there has been
relatively little dialogue on this topic between criminal law or procedure scholars
and criminologists or social scientists. 6
In this article, we will use the empirical study of wrongful convictions to
illustrate what criminological approaches-or, more broadly, social science
methods--can teach criminal law scholars and professors. In Part II, we will
briefly review the history of wrongful conviction scholarship to situate the role of
legal scholars and social scientists in its development. In Part III, we will examine
and critique the methodology of legal scholarship on wrongful convictions, which
is primarily narrative and tends to focus exclusively on single case studies. In Part
IV, we will describe social scientific approaches to the study of wrongful
conviction, which, we argue, will allow for more precise and accurate depictions of
the multifactorial and complex nature of causation in wrongful conviction cases as
well as the variables that mediate between rightful acquittal and wrongful
conviction. We will then discuss and illustrate several social science approaches to
the study of wrongful conviction-systematic data collection, matched comparison
samples, and path analysis-that will help both scholars and practitioners to better
understand the causes, characteristics, and consequences of wrongful conviction
than they can using purely narrative methods. Finally, in Part V, we offer
concluding thoughts about improving the dialogue between criminal law and
criminology on the subject of wrongful conviction. While rejecting a "gloomy"
24 See generally GEORGE C. THOMAS III, THE SUPREME COURT ON TRIAL: How THE AMERICAN
JUSTICE SYSTEM SACRIFICES INNOCENT DEFENDANTS (2008).
25 Medwed, supra note 14, at 1549.
26 For example, as we discuss later in this article, law professors Samuel Gross and Barbara
O'Brien published an empirical study in 2008 analyzing predictors of exoneration (as opposed to
execution) in two matched samples of post-Furman death penalty convictions. See Samuel R. Gross
& Barbara O'Brien, Frequency and Predictors of False Conviction: Why We Know So Little, and
New Data on Capital Cases, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 927 (2008). However, Gross and O'Brien's
study missed important literature that predated their study, such as criminologist Talia Harmon's
similar matched comparison sample study of post-Furman death penalty exonerations and executions
published seven years earlier in 2001 and another related study of post-Furman death penalty
exonerations and executions published by Harmon and fellow criminologist William Lofquist in
2005. See Talia Roitberg Harmon, Predictors of Miscarriages of Justice in Capital Cases, 18 JUST.
Q. 949 (2001) [hereinafter Harmon, Predictors of Miscarriages]; Talia Roitberg Harmon & William
S. Lofquist, Too Late for Luck: A Comparison of Post-Furman Exonerations and Executions of the
Innocent, 51 CRIME & DELINQ. 498 (2005). See infra text accompanying notes 92-98. Neither study
is mentioned in a recent review article by Gross. See Samuel R. Gross, Convicting the Innocent, 4
ANN. REv. L. & Soc. SCI. 173 (2008). While Professors Gross and O'Brien's contributions are
valuable, they leave to other scholars the task of preparing a thorough and up-to-date review of the
pertinent research literature on this topic.
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assessment of research into wrongful convictions, 27 we argue that legal scholars
should draw more deliberately from criminological and social science methods to
refine our understanding of the multiple factors and conditions that lead to
erroneous convictions of the innocent.
II. A SHORT HISTORY OF WRONGFUL CONVICTION SCHOLARSHIP
The study of wrongful convictions has a long history in American
scholarship.28 For almost a century, a number of writers have documented
numerous convictions of the innocent and described their causes and
consequences. The writer generally credited with kick-starting the study of
wrongful conviction is Yale law professor Edward Borchard, who first wrote about
the subject in a 1913 article published in the Journal of the American Institute of
Criminal Law and Criminology (continued by the Journal of Criminal Law and
Criminology in 1931).29 Yet, it is his 1932 book, Convicting the Innocent, that is
generally regarded as the breakthrough historical work on the subject. In that time,
he documented sixty-five cases in which innocent defendants were wrongfully
convicted, identified the legal causes underlying these convictions, and proposed
reforms to remedy the problem.
30
Convicting the Innocent was significant because it shifted the debate away
from whether actually innocent individuals were wrongfully convicted in the
American criminal justice system to the question of why they were wrongfully
convicted and what could be done to correct the problem. Borchard, in effect,
created the template that would be used to study wrongful convictions for many
years to come: identify wrongful conviction cases, describe their legal causes, and
propose reforms to prevent future miscarriages. In the late 1940s, Ere Stanley
Gardner, the author of the fictional Perry Mason thrillers, created "the Court of
Last Resort," an unofficial body to investigate suspected cases of wrongful
conviction-in effect, the first innocence project in America. In 1952, Gardner
would publish a book (bearing this title31) in the same template created by
Borchard, as would the famous judge Jerome Frank (with his daughter) in 1957,32
27 Gross & O'Brien, supra note 26, at 958.
28 See generally Leo, supra note 22.
29 Edwin M. Borchard, European Systems of State Indemnity for Errors of Criminal Justice, 3
J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 684 (1913). As Rory Little has pointed out, the early history
of actual innocence "has been largely forgotten." Rory K. Little, Addressing the Evidentiary Sources
of Wrongful Convictions: Categorical Exclusion of Evidence in Capital Statutes, 37 Sw. U. L. REv.
101, 103 n.5 (2008).
30 See EDWIN M. BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: ERRORS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
(1932).
31 ERLE STANLEY GARDNER, THE COURT OF LAST RESORT (1952).
32 JUDGE JEROME FRANK & BARBARA FRANK, NOT GUILTY (1957).
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and Edward Radin in 1964.33 Written by lawyers and journalists, these books were
driven both by a narrative methodology and a moral outrage over the unjust fate of
the wrong man convicted. Although they were compelling, the exoneration
narratives described in these books failed to persuade others that wrongful
convictions represented a systemic problem in the criminal justice system as
opposed to a few anomalous, if deeply troubling, travesties of justice. For decades,
the problem of wrongful conviction generated very little interest among criminal
justice officials, policy-makers or the public.
Hugo Bedau and Michael Radelet attempted to change that with their
watershed 1987 Stanford Law Review article, Miscarriages of Justice in
Potentially Capital Cases,34 which marked the beginning of a new era of research
on the problem of wrongful conviction. Bedau and Radelet documented and
systematically analyzed 350 cases of wrongful conviction-based mostly, but not
entirely, on official declarations of innocence-in potentially capital cases from
1900 to 1985, twenty-three of which led to executions.35 By documenting so many
cases of erroneous conviction, and demonstrating that they occurred even in capital
cases, Bedau and Radelet sought to challenge traditional assumptions about the
fallibility of human judgments in the criminal justice system, especially in its most
serious cases. Bedau and Radelet also analyzed patterns in the sources of errors,
sources of discovery of the errors, and sources of exoneration across these cases.
Bedau and Radelet's article raised fundamental questions about the
phenomenon of wrongful conviction in capital cases, triggering intense debate
about the risk of executing the innocent. Following Bedau and Radelet's lead,
more scholars and journalists began to write about the problem of wrongful
convictions in the late 1980s and early 1990s.36 Radelet, Bedau, and colleagues
continued to collect, analyze, and publish research on wrongful convictions in
capital cases, and others reanalyzed their data.37 But, to some extent, Bedau and
Radelet's message became mired in disagreements about whether a small number
of individuals in their study were actually guilty and, more generally, about
whether their scholarship was just another ideological move in the contentious
33 EDWARD D. RADIN, THE INNOCENTS (1964).
34 Bedau & Radelet, supra note 10.
35 Bedau and Radelet have since argued that a 24th innocent person, Jessie Tafero, was
executed in 1994. See Hugo Adam Bedau et al., Convicting the Innocent in Capital Cases: Criteria,
Evidence, and Inference, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 587, 598 (2004).
36 See, e.g., DONALD S. CONNERY, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: THE STORY OF A MURDER, A
FALSE CONFESSION, AND THE STRUGGLE TO FREE A "WRONG MAN" (1996); MARTIN YANT, PRESUMED
GUILTY: WHEN INNOCENT PEOPLE ARE WRONGLY CONVICTED (1991).
37 See, e.g., Samuel R. Gross, The Risks of Death: Why Erroneous Convictions Are Common
in Capital Cases, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 469 (1996); James Acker et al., No Appeal From the Grave:
Innocence, Capital Punishment, and the Lessons of History, in WRONGLY CONVICTED: PERSPECTIVES
ON FAILED JUSTICE 154 (Saundra D. Westervelt & John A. Humphrey eds., 2001).
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debate about the desirability of the death penalty in American scholarship and
society.35
In the late 1980s, the renewed interest in wrongful convictions was catapulted
forward by the introduction of DNA testing in criminal cases.39 In 1989, DNA was
used to exonerate an innocent prisoner, Gary Dotson, who had been wrongfully
incarcerated for ten years in Illinois for a rape he did not commit.40 In the twenty
years since Dotson's exoneration, post-conviction DNA testing has led to the
release of more than 230 additional wrongly convicted prisoners, 41 and appears to
have dramatically changed official and popular attitudes about the criminal justice
system. Many of the individual DNA exonerations have garnered tremendous
coverage in print and electronic media,42 and the DNA cases collectively have
provided an unprecedented opportunity to better understand the nature and
consequences of factual error in the American criminal justice system. These
DNA exonerations, and the substantial media attention they have received, have
inspired extensive legal scholarship to the point that law reviews are now full of
articles on the various legal causes and problems of wrongful conviction cases as
well as proposed reforms.43
Much of this scholarship illustrates a traditional narrative or "familiar
structure"--one that dates back to Borchard and the template he first laid down-
but with new and updated cases.44 Perhaps no book illustrates the modem version
of this story better than Barry Scheck, Peter Neufeld, and Jim Dwyer's, Actual
Innocence: Five Days to Execution, and Other Dispatches From the Wrongly
Convicted, which may be the signature document of the modem innocence
movement. Written by two well-known criminal defense lawyers, one of whom is
also a law professor,45 and a journalist, Actual Innocence is the rare book that has
been both an influential work of legal scholarship and a popular best-seller.46 In
38 See generally Stephen J. Markman & Paul G. Cassell, Protecting the Innocent: A Response
to the Bedau-Radelet Study, 41 STAN. L. REv. 121 (1988); Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet,
The Myth of Infallibility: A Reply to Markman and Cassell, 41 STAN. L. REv. 161 (1988); Acker et
al., supra note 37.
39 DNA testing was first allowed into court as evidence in the New York case of People v.
Wesley. GOULD, supra note 12, at 17.
40 Gross et al., Exonerations, supra note 1, at 523.
41 Innocence Project, Mission Statement, http://www.innocenceproject.org/about/Mission-
Statement.php (last visited Sept. 4, 2009).
42 Leo, supra note 22, at 202 ("In the past decade, there have been more newspaper stories,
magazine articles, and television documentaries on the plight of the wrongfully convicted than ever
before.").
43 As Dan Medwed points out, twelve major law reviews have published symposia on issues
related to wrongful convictions from 2002-2008. Medwed, supra note 14, at 1550.
4 Leo, supra note 22, at 203, 207.
45 Barry Scheck is a clinical law professor at Cardozo Law School in New York City.
46 See, e.g., Corinna Barrett Lain, Deciding Death, 57 DuKE L.J. 1, 45 (2007) ("By all
accounts, Actual Innocence was an enormously influential book; indeed, its haunting narratives were
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the next section, we will discuss this book and other examples of legal scholarship
on wrongful convictions to frame the issue of what we believe criminal law and
procedure scholars can learn from social science approaches on this topic.
III. LAW'S NARRATIVE METHODOLOGY AND THE STUDY OF WRONGFUL
CONVICTION
Unlike the social and physical sciences, legal scholarship is premised on
doctrinal, not empirical, research. Although there has been a move of late to bring
empirical skills to legal scholarship,47 neither quantitative nor qualitative methods
are endemic to legal study, nor would a typical law professor be expected to
acquire a facility with these methods. The typical path to the law professoriate is
either through legal practice or a series of status markers based on one's
performance as a law student (good grades and law review, leading to a prestigious
judicial clerkship and an impressive first job). By contrast, scholars in the social
sciences receive substantial methodological training and undergo an extensive
apprenticeship while in graduate school to become proficient empirical
researchers.
Our point is not to criticize or reject legal scholarship but to point out the
inherent differences between legal and social science research. By default, the
methodology of law is doctrinal, reflecting the traditional legal training that law
professors received in law school, as well as American law's obsession with cases
as a means of making and expressing law, resolving disputes, and achieving
justice. Cases are, of course, stories, and that is what legal scholarship primarily
trades in: to the extent that legal scholarship has a methodology, it is case-based
description, analysis, and prescription. Narratives are powerful and compelling
vehicles for communicating injustices. As Radelet, Bedau, and Putnam have
noted, "Everyone knows that a good story is more gripping than the best
sociological research or philosophical analysis."4 8 Perhaps more so than any other
area of law, criminal cases make especially good stories.49 And "wrong man"
cases-exoneration narratives-make the best stories of all. As Susan Bandes
points out, "The lure of the innocence cases lies in their simplicity and clarity-
their promise of a clear line between the deserving and the undeserving. The
stories are vivid; the injustice is easy to understand on an emotional level. 5°
instrumental in causing conservative commentator George Will to publicly express his own doubts
about the death penalty's efficacy and fairness.").
47 Witness the recent rise of the annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies, its associated
blog (www.elsblog.org), and the creation of the Journal of Empirical Legal Studies.
48 MICHAEL L. RADELET ET AL., IN SPITE OF INNOCENCE: ERRONEOUS CoNvIcTIONS IN CAPITAL
CASES ix-x (1992).
49 See, e.g., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE STORIES (Carol S. Steiker ed., 2006).
50 Susan A. Bandes, Framing Wrongful Convictions, 2008 UTAH L. REv. 5, 9.
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Scheck, Neufeld, and Dwyer's Actual Innocence tells many such vivid stories
of injustice-the stories of the first sixty-two DNA exoneration cases, to be more
exact.51 Some of these innocents spent decades in prison before being exonerated
and released, others came within days or weeks of being executed, some were
convicted wrongfully not once but twice, 2 and all suffered enormous indignities,
pain, and loss. Each chapter of Actual Innocence tells one or more of these stories
and illustrates the various legal causes of wrongful conviction--eyewitness
misidentification, police-induced false confessions, junk science, jailhouse
informant perjury, prosecutorial misconduct, incompetent defense lawyers, and
racism-around which most of the chapters are organized. Scheck, Neufeld, and
Dwyer also tell these stories to illustrate how the erroneous convictions were
discovered, the lessons they teach us about the criminal justice system, and to
propose a series of systemic reforms, including abolition of the death penalty.
Although Actual Innocence was written for a popular, rather than academic or
legal, audience, it essentially tracks much of the legal scholarship on wrongful
convictions. Like those publications, Actual Innocence is, first and foremost, a
narrative exposition of wrong man cases.53 Its method is the case study told
through the exoneration narrative. Like virtually all legal scholarship on wrongful
convictions since Borchard, it uses exoneration narratives to survey the traditional
legal categories of error and propose systemic reforms. Many, if not most, law
review articles about wrongful conviction essentially do the same thing. 4 Some
law review articles are focused on a single case study, 5 some are focused on
multiple cases, 56 some are focused on a particular legal cause or causes of
wrongful conviction,57 and many are focused on proposed reforms. 58
51 SCHECK ET AL., supra note 8.
52 For example, Kirk Bloodsworth, Ronald Cotton, Rolando Cruz, Alejandro Hernandez,
Willie Rainge, and Dennis Williams were all wrongfully convicted twice before being exonerated by
DNA. See Innocence Project, Browse the Profiles, http://www.innocenceproject.org/know/Browse-
Profiles.php (last visited Sept. 4, 2009).
53 Some law review articles are individual case studies that do the same thing. See, e.g.,
Daniel S. Medwed, Anatomy of a Wrongful Conviction: Theoretical Implications and Practical
Solutions, 51 VILL. L. REV. 337 (2006). See also Susan Rutberg, Anatomy of a Miscarriage of
Justice: The Wrongful Conviction of Peter J Rose, 37 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 7 (2006).
54 See Leo, supra note 22, at 207.
55 See, e.g., Medwed, supra note 14; Rutberg, supra note 53.
56 See, e.g., Garrett, supra note 6.
57 See, e.g., Sandra Guerra Thompson, Beyond a Reasonable Doubt? Reconsidering
Uncorroborated Eyewitness Identification Testimony, 41 U.C. DAVis L. REv. 1487 (2008); Alexandra
Natapoff, Beyond Unreliable: How Snitches Contribute to Wrongful Convictions, 37 GOLDEN GATE
U. L. REV. 107 (2006); Welsh S. White, Confessions in Capital Cases, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 979;
Simon A. Cole, Comment, The Prevalence and Potential Causes of Wrongful Conviction By
Fingerprint Evidence, 37 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 39 (2006).
58 For example, see the symposia on wrongful convictions in the Drake University Law
Review and Wisconsin Law Review. See, e.g., Symposium, Wrongful Convictions, 52 DRAKE L. REV.
587 (2004); Symposium, Reflections on Innocence, 2006 Wis. L. REV. 237.
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We mention Actual Innocence not to criticize-it is a well-written and
important book that appears to have had a transformative effect both on American
popular attitudes about wrongful conviction and on public policy discussions and
reforms 59-but to use it as an example of the narrative methodology of much legal
scholarship about miscarriages of justice. The strength of narrative legal
scholarship on wrongful convictions is that it tells and analyzes compelling stories
of injustice. Scholarship based on exoneration narratives helps us better
understand the contexts of erroneous convictions and may motivate others to think
harder about potential reforms.
But the narrative method has significant limitations. Foremost among these,
scholarship based on stories about wrongful conviction tends to oversimplify
causation. As sociologist Charles Tilly points out, "Even when they convey truths,
stories enormously simplify the processes involved .... [S]tories will omit a large
number of likely causes, necessary conditions and, especially, competing
explanations of whatever happened .... Stories simplify actors, actions, causes,
and effects. Their rationales gain clarity through simplification.
6°
Rarely does legal scholarship delve deeply or systematically into the
multifactorial, interactive, and complex nature of human and institutional causation
in wrongful conviction cases. Instead, wrongful conviction scholarship tends to
portray causation as unidimensional-one case illustrates the problem of
eyewitness misidentification, another case demonstrates the problem of false
confession, a third case exhibits the problem of junk science, etc.--even though we
know that cases of wrongful conviction have multiple sources. 61 Consider the
cases that one of us uncovered in the work of the Innocence Commission for
Virginia (ICVA). The ICVA investigated eleven exonerations from rape or murder
convictions in Virginia, identifying seven categories of errors common in these
cases. These included faulty eyewitness identification procedures, problematic
interrogation methods, shoddy forensic science, inadequate defense representation,
failure to disclose questionable evidence, tunnel vision, and ineffective post-
conviction procedures. Yet not a single case had a sole cause.62 In some cases,
like that of David Vasquez, a suspect of low intelligence fell victim to high-
pressure interrogation methods, an error that was compounded by the tunnel vision
of police and prosecutors and amateurish hair comparison. 63 In other cases, likethat of Jeffrey Cox, upwards of six factors were associated with a wrongful
59 See Lain, supra note 46; Little, supra note 29, at 104 n.8.
60 CHARLES "iLLY, WHY? 65, 70, 72 (2006).
61 GOULD, supra note 12, at 127. As we discuss further below, understanding causation in
social phenomena is rarely simple. As Tilly notes, "In our complex world, causes and effects always
join in complicated ways. Simultaneous causation, incremental effects, environmental effects,
mistakes, unintended consequences, and feedback make physical, biological, and social processes the
devil's own work--or the Lord's-to explain in detail." TILLY, supra note 60, at 65.
62 GOULD, supra note 12, at 127.
63 Id. at 112-19.
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conviction. Not only was Cox initially fingered as a suspect by unreliable and self-
interested witnesses, but he was also failed by police, prosecutors, his own
attorney, and the courts, all of whom relied on questionable, and in some cases
hidden, evidence. 64  In such cases, it is impossible (and methodologically
inappropriate) to speak of there being a primary cause for the wrongful
conviction.65
If we were to halt the investigation at exoneration narratives, we would rob
the literature of deeper analysis that could unpack the unique causes,
characteristics, and consequences of wrongful conviction. For example,
comparison samples-which match cases of rightful acquittal (or rightful
conviction) against cases of wrongful conviction-will likely tell us more about
causation than exoneration narratives. 66 Yet legal scholarship and its descriptive
method oversimplifies cause and effect relationships, in turn offering accounts and
findings that are not always representative of the full range and complexity of
wrongful conviction phenomena.
IV. LEARNING FROM SOCIAL SCIENCE
A. General
Social science is primarily concerned with understanding the world as it is
rather than as it ought to be. The goal of traditional social science is generalizable
knowledge. Empirical social scientists draw on five primary methods of data
gathering-experiments, field observation, surveys, interviews, and analysis of
documents-to produce valid and reliable knowledge about social phenomena.
These methodologies are foreign to most law professors and legal scholars. Social
scientists study cases and narratives as well, but the researchers are more likely to
describe these as sources of data than as a method or methodology. They are also
more likely to study narratives to discern identifiable-generalizable-patterns and
explanations across cases.
Empirical social science also seeks to identify more precisely the causal
relationships found in social phenomena. However, social scientists recognize that
studying causation can be elusive. Observed patterns or events may indicate that
two variables are associated or co-vary because they are correlated rather than
because one causes the other. Strictly speaking, social scientists can only infer
causal relationships with certainty through experiments or randomized control
trials in which they can randomly assign subjects, introduce a stimulus on the
experimental group (and a placebo on the control group), and measure the
independent effect of the stimulus on the observed outcome. But in the study of
64 Id. at 94-99.
65 See id. at 127-28.
66 See Leo, supra note 22, at 216-17. We address paired samples later in this article. See
infra text accompanying notes 81-96.
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many social phenomena-including most aspects of wrongful conviction-it is not
possible to conduct meaningful experiments for ethical and/or logistical reasons
(e.g., researchers cannot expose research subjects to coercive interrogations in
order to induce false confessions).67 But, as we will discuss in greater depth
below, social scientists (and a few non-traditional legal scholars) have relied on
other empirical approaches to attempt to make more precise causal statements
about patterns and risk factors in the study of wrongful convictions.
By contrast, more traditional legal scholars have tended to view wrongful
convictions through law's more simplified model of cause and effect: a wrongful
conviction occurred, a cause is presumed, and the trigger is sought in order to
prevent its harmful effects in the future. It is not surprising that legal research on
erroneous convictions should appear this way, since law school teaches that
wrongs have causes, that causes can be prevented, and that injuries from an
unacceptable cause warrant recompense to the victim and punishment to the
wrongdoer. Indeed, that is the very basis of both criminal and tort law.
Social science offers a better model to understand the nature of causation in
wrongful convictions. Wrongful convictions do not appear to have a simple
explanation of cause and effect. To call the traditional factors that lead to
wrongful conviction--eyewitness misidentifications, false confessions, informant
perjury, junk science, tunnel vision, police, and prosecutorial error, etc.-"causes"
is to miss the fact that many of these forces are found in other cases that do not end
in erroneous convictions. In other words, as both of us have pointed out
elsewhere, many of the same factors that are present in cases that lead to wrongful
convictions are also present in cases that lead to both rightful acquittals and
rightful convictions.68 Moreover, it is difficult to speak of a single cause of any
particular wrongful conviction because, as mentioned above, wrongful conviction
cases typically involve more than one of these factors-in most cases we are likely
dealing with a "perfect storm" of errors that together have led to the conviction of
an innocent person. This is not unlike other social phenomena. As Michael Rutter
has noted, "a causal effect is usually composed of a constellation of components
acting in concert . . . .There is no such thing as a single basic necessary and
sufficient cause.,
69
67 The empirical study of eyewitness misidentification is an exception. There have been
hundreds of ecologically valid experimental studies that have given us great insight into the reasons
why police line-up and photo-spread procedures lead to eyewitness errors and what police can do
differently to prevent such misidentifications. See, e.g., Steve Clark et al., Regularities in Eyewitness
Identification, 32 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 187 (2008); Gary L. Wells et al., Eyewitness Identification
Procedures: Recommendations for Lineups and Photospreads, 22 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 603 (1998).
See also Thompson, supra note 57.
68 Leo, supra note 22, at 217 (noting that many of the same factors that are present in
wrongful convictions are also present in rightful acquittals). See also GOULD, supra note 12, at 127.
69 Michael Rutter, Proceeding From Observed Correlation to Causal Inference: The Use of
Natural Experiments, 2 PERSP. PSYCHOL. Sci. 377, 377 (2007).
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Social science approaches to studying the problem of wrongful conviction are
preferable to the simplifying narrative methodology of traditional legal scholarship
because they allow for more accurate, robust, and precise depictions of the
complex and unpredictable constellation of factors that likely cause wrongful
conviction. 70 They also do a better job of capturing the interaction of effects and
variables that mediate between the outcomes of wrongful conviction and rightful
acquittal. Social science approaches thus permit more accurate and sophisticated-
as well as more generalizable-causal judgments about the factors that do and do
not lead to wrongful conviction. In the remainder of this article, we describe and
illustrate three types of social scientific approaches to studying wrongful
conviction-aggregated case studies, matched comparison samples, and path
analysis-to better understand why they are more informative, rigorous, and
potentially predictive than traditional legal methods.
B. Social Science Approaches
1. Aggregated Case Studies
As we have seen, legal wrongful conviction scholarship tends to rely on story-
telling and exoneration narratives in individual cases. We have argued that this
simplifies and omits, creating an incomplete understanding of the causes and
consequences of wrongful conviction. But social science approaches sometimes
also rely on narratives and case data. One way to make more systematic the study
of cases is to aggregate them, create a coding instrument to classify (demographic,
legal, case, outcome) variables found in them and then identify and analyze the
patterns, correlations, and outcomes that emerge from the aggregated data.
One of the under-appreciated contributions of Bedau and Radelet's research
on miscarriages of justice was their use of the aggregate case study method to
identify, quantify, and describe the sources of error, and the sources of discovery
of error, in potentially capital wrongful conviction cases. Bedau and Radelet
continued to extend and publish articles from this data set,71 including some with
additional co-authors,7 2 and others have analyzed patterns in Bedau and Radelet's
data set for additional insights into the causes and consequences of wrongful
70 As sociologist Charles Tilly points out, "Even when they convey truths, stories enormously
simplify the processes involved. They single out a small number of actors, actions, causes, and
effects for easy understanding, and articulate far better with assignments of responsibility than do
ordinary scientific explanations." TiLLY, supra note 60, at 65.
71 See Michael L. Radelet & Hugo Adam Bedau, The Execution of the Innocent, 61 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 105 (1998).
72 These authors include William S. Lofquist and Constance E. Putnam. See, e.g., Michael L.
Radelet et al., Prisoners Released From Death Rows Since 1970 Because of Doubts About Their
Guilt, 13 T.M. COOLEY L. REv. 907 (1996); RADELET, ET AL., supra note 48; Bedau et al., supra note
35.
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conviction in capital cases.73 Bedau and Radelet have also inspired other scholars
to use the aggregated case study method to analyze the wrongful conviction
phenomena more broadly,74 as well as specific legal causes of wrongful conviction
such as police induced false confessions75 and jailhouse informant perjury. 76 In
addition to Bedau and Radelet's watershed study, there are thus several other
prominent examples of the use of the aggregated case study method in the
wrongful conviction literature.77
These studies have been valuable in more systematically advancing our
knowledge of miscarriages of justice. They have helped us to identify and analyze
patterns and outcomes in the aggregate more clearly and thus to make more
empirically accurate generalizations about the legal causes and consequences of
wrongful conviction. So far, however, the assembled data sets have only been
used to provide descriptive, not inferential, statistics. The reason, we believe, is
that existing aggregated case studies, such as those by Bedau and Radelet 78 and
Gross and colleagues,79 have consisted of cases with only one outcome (i.e.,
dependent) variable-wrongful conviction of the innocent. In order to estimate the
influence of the potentially explanatory (i.e., independent) variables-such as
eyewitness misidentification, false confession, tunnel vision, and bad lawyering-
on case outcomes, future aggregated case studies need to include more variation in
case outcomes.8 ° Otherwise, we are limited to describing what factors are common
in wrongful conviction cases rather than explaining how cases of erroneous
conviction differ from rightful acquittals or convictions.
As a next step, scholars need to collect descriptive data about a broader set of
cases-comparing cases of wrongful conviction with those of rightful conviction
or rightful acquittal-in order to statistically analyze the role of potential
explanatory variables in accounting for these different outcomes. The traditional
73 See, e.g., Gross, The Risks of Death, supra note 37.
74 See, e.g., Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, The Consequences of False Confessions:
Deprivations of Liberty and Miscarriages of Justice in the Age of Psychological Interrogation, 88 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 429 (1998). See also Drizin & Leo, supra note 3.
75 See, e.g., Drizin & Leo, supra note 3; Leo & Ofshe, supra note 74.
76 ROB WARDEN, CENTER ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS RESEARCH REPORT, THE ROLE OF
FALSE CONFESSIONS IN ILLINOIS WRONGFUL MURDER CONVICTIONS SINCE 1970 (2003),
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/wrongfulconvictions/issues/causesandremedies/falseconfessions/Fa
lseConfessionsStudy.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2009).
77 See, e.g., Gross et al., supra note 1; Leo & Ofshe, supra note 74.
78 See, e.g., Bedau & Radelet, supra note 10.
79 See, e.g., Gross et al., supra note 1.
80 Some aggregated case studies allow us to make inferential comparisons about the risk of
error. For example, we know that black men accused of raping white women are at a higher risk of
being wrongfully convicted than white men accused of raping white women. We also know that
juveniles are at a greater risk of being coerced into falsely confessing than other suspects. These are
merely two examples of the kind of empirical knowledge we can acquire through aggregated case
studies. See generally Gross et al., supra note 1; Drizin & Leo, supra note 3.
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technique for such inferential analysis is multivariate regression, which permits
researchers to evaluate how much of the variation in particular outcomes is
explained by specific case variables and which variables predict and do not predict
different case outcomes. Inferential statistics would also allow us to control for the
effects of explanatory variables on one another and to determine whether or not
certain observed correlations between two variables-such as the race of the
defendant and the likelihood of wrongful conviction, for example, are statistically
significant (i.e., not due to chance) and thus likely to be causally related.
2. Matched Comparison Samples
Another related social science methodology involves the use of matched
comparison samples. This involves identifying two separate groups of cases that
are matched on similar independent variables (such as type of crime, prior felony
record, etc.) in order to, in effect, control for the potential explanatory effect of
these influences on case outcomes. A matched comparison sample methodology
would allow scholars to more accurately determine what factors are uniquely
present in wrongful conviction cases, as well as to statistically test hypotheses
about what factors may be causally related to or predict wrongful conviction. For
example, researchers could compare a set of wrongful conviction cases against a
set of rightful acquittal cases or with a set of rightful conviction cases. The former
would explore the differences between cases where some innocent defendants are
convicted and those in which they are acquitted; the latter would allow scholars to
more systematically test the differences between cases in which the innocent are
convicted and those in which the guilty are convicted.
So far there have been four studies of wrongful convictions using a matched
sample methodology, two by criminologists 8' and, very recently, two by non-
traditional criminal law scholars.82 In the first study, Talia Harmon assembled a
data set of seventy-six cases from 1970 to 1998 in which death row prisoners were
exonerated and released. She also assembled a comparison data set of a random
sample of matched inmates "convicted at trial and executed, from the same states
and in numbers comparable to those of the inmates who were released from death
1183
row. The comparison cases were also matched "with releases according to
jurisdiction and year of conviction.' 84 Harmon used logistic regression equations
to test which factors (i.e., independent variables) predicted judicial exonerations in
capital cases, finding that the discovery of new evidence, allegations of perjury,
81 Harmon, Predictors of Miscarriages, supra note 26; Harmon & Lofquist, supra note 26.
82 Garrett, supra note 6; Gross & O'Brien, supra note 26.
83 Harmon, Predictors of Miscarriages, supra note 26, at 958. Harmon adds: "I matched the
comparison cases with the releases according to the state and year of conviction. If more than one
match existed for a particular case, I selected at random, using a random numbers table. If a match
could not be accomplished with the same year of conviction, I used the closest year possible." Id.
'4 Id. at 951.
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and type of attorney8 5 were all statistically significant predictors of judicial
exonerations in capital cases. Harmon found that the amount of evidence
introduced at trial was also a statistically significant predictor of exonerations-
namely that fewer types of evidence were used in capital cases that eventually
resulted in exonerations.
86
In a second, more recent matched comparison sample study,87 Harmon and
criminologist William Lofquist compared not the innocent to the guilty in capital
cases, but the innocent to the innocent-eighty-one judicial exonerations of
innocent death row prisoners to sixteen executions of death row prisoners whom
they believed to be innocent.88  Their goal was to identify factors that would
statistically predict case outcomes of death row prisoners with strong claims of
factual innocence-i.e., why some individuals wrongly convicted of capital crimes
were exonerated while others were executed. As in Harmon's previous study,
Harmon and Lofquist used a logistic regression model to test several hypotheses.
They found that allegations of perjury, multiple types of evidence, a prior felony
record, type of attorney at trial, and the race of the defendant were all significant
predictors of case outcomes. In short, defendants who had a private or resource
center lawyer representing them at trial (as opposed to a public defender) were
significantly more likely to have their capital conviction (correctly) overturned and
be exonerated than be (erroneously) executed. The same was true for convicted
capital defendants, whose prosecutors relied on fewer forms of evidence at trial,
who raised allegations of perjury on appeal, who did not have a prior felony
record, or whose case involved an African-American defendant and a white
victim.
89
Perhaps the most comprehensive study of wrongful convictions using a
matched comparison sample methodology is Brandon Garrett's recent analysis of
the first 200 innocent prisoners who were released after post-conviction DNA
testing exonerated them.90 Of these, Garrett selected the 121 non-capital cases that
contained a written decision and assembled a matched comparison group of 121
85 This variable measured whether the defendant was represented by a private appellate
attorney or legal resource center. Id.
86 Harmon also found that allegations of Brady violations, allegations of police misconduct,
the type of attorney at trial, and the defendant's race were not statistically significant predictors of
judicial exonerations. Harmon, Predictors of Miscarriages, supra note 26, at 961-66.
87 See Harmon & Lofquist, supra note 26.
88 Of course, post-execution estimates can be tricky. One of the sixteen executed individuals
included in Harmon & Lofquist's study was Roger Keith Coleman, who was executed in 1992.
Many scholars and activists believed that Coleman was innocent and executed for a crime (rape-
murder) that he did not commit. See JOHN C. TUCKER, MAY GOD HAvE MERCY: A TRUE STORY OF
CRIME AND PuNiSHMENT (1997). In January of 2006, DNA testing established that Coleman was, in
fact, guilty of the rape-murder for which he was executed. See generally Todd E. Pettys, Killing
Roger Coleman: Habeas, Finality, and the Innocence Gap, 48 WM. & MARY L. REv. 2313 (2007).
89 See generally Harmon & Lofquist, supra note 26.
90 Garrett, supra note 6.
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non-capital cases that lacked DNA evidence showing innocence or guilt. These
cases were randomly selected using a Westlaw search to find all cases that had a
published decision from the same state and same year as the DNA exoneration
cases and involved a conviction for the same crime. Unlike the studies by Harmon
and Lofquist, Garrett sought to understand how the criminal justice system handled
the cases of persons wrongly convicted but eventually exonerated by post-
conviction DNA testing. The matched comparison sample, thus, provided a non-
DNA control group of sorts, but, as Garrett points out, he did not know how many
in the matched comparison group were innocent. In addition, the matched
comparison group contained less available information about the evidence
supporting the convictions because there were no news reports about these cases,
unlike in the DNA exonerations, many of which were high profile.
For the most part, the criminal justice case processing of the matched control
group in Garrett's study appears similar to the group of DNA exonerations.
Although one to two percent of criminal cases are generally reversed following
appellate review, the figure was ten percent for the matched comparison sample
and nine percent for the DNA exonerations, a statistically insignificant difference
suggesting that non-capital rape and murder cases are highly prone to post-
conviction reversal compared to other criminal cases. The DNA exoneration cases
and matched comparison sample were also similar insofar as both groups
challenged the facts underlying their convictions at similar rates, and received
reversals based on factual (as opposed to procedural) claims at similar rates. The
DNA exonerees did pursue post-conviction review more often than the matched
comparison sample (raising innocence claims more frequently), but ultimately this
did not matter for their respective reversal rates.
Ironically, the real import of Garrett's study for wrongful conviction scholars
comes not so much from the comparison to the matched sample, but from what his
descriptive statistics of the first 200 DNA exonerations tell us: namely, that courts
repeatedly misjudged the defendants' innocence and that lawyers, existing legal
procedures, and actual innocence all failed to prevent these individuals from being
wrongfully convicted. Garrett also describes why this occurred. As he notes,
"[t]hese exonerees could not effectively litigate their factual innocence, likely due
to a combination of unfavorable legal standards, unreceptive courts, faulty criminal
investigation by law enforcement, inadequate representation at trial or afterwards,
and a lack of resources for factual investigation that might have uncovered
miscarriages. ' '91
Most recently, Samuel Gross and Barbara O'Brien have compared a sample
of 105 cases of capital defendants who were sentenced to death and exonerated
between 1976-2003 with a random sample of 137 executions carried out in the
same period.92 The two samples are thus matched for type of case and time period
in which they occurred. Gross and O'Brien raise the question: what is unique
91 Garrett, supra note 6, at 131.
92 Gross & O'Brien, supra note 26.
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about capital cases that lead to exonerations versus those that lead to execution?
This is the same question Talia Harmon asked and analyzed seven years earlier
with a similar data set in the first study of wrongful convictions using a matched
comparison sample methodology. 93  Yet Gross and O'Brien do not discuss
Hannon's similar published research or findings about predictors of exonerations
in post-Furman capital cases.94
Gross and O'Brien's analysis implicitly assumes that the convicted capital
defendants who were executed are guilty and the ones who were exonerated are
innocent, though they are careful to qualify this point by attributing judgments
about sufficiency of evidence to the legal system.95 Unlike Harmon and Lofquist's
study (which compared the innocent executed to the innocent exonerated) but like
Harmon's study, Gross and O'Brien compare the innocent exonerated to the guilty
executed.96  Using chi-square tests rather than regression models, Gross and
O'Brien identify several statistically significant differences between the capital
convictions leading to exoneration and those leading to execution. Defendants
who were exonerated were significantly less likely to be reported as mentally ill,
more likely to have been tried for crimes that involve two or less victims, more
likely to have been tried for crimes that involve children as victims, less likely to
have confessed, more likely to have claimed innocence at trial, and more likely to
have had an extensive criminal record (especially violent felonies).97 In addition,
in the capital cases leading to exonerations, the time from crime to arrest was
significantly much longer than in the cases leading to execution. 98  Gross and
O'Brien's analysis demonstrates that these differences are modest predictors of
exoneration in capital cases.
93 Harmon, Predictors of Miscarriages, supra note 26.
94 Gross and O'Brien's article is a good example of the disconnect or lack of communication
between scholars from the disciplines of law and criminology. Both Gross and O'Brien are law
professors, both Harmon and Lofquist are criminologists. Although their research question, data,
methods and findings are similar, Gross & O'Brien missed Harmon's 2001 article and Harmon &
Lofquist's 2005 article on statistical predictors of judicial exoneration in post-Furman capital cases.
See supra note 26. Because of these omissions, it is unclear how Gross and O'Brien's recent article
on statistical predictors of judicial exonerations in post-Furman capital cases builds on the earlier
scholarship of Harmon and Lofquist on statistical predictors of judicial exonerations in post-Furman
capital cases.
95 Gross & O'Brien, supra note 26, at 948 ("For those who were put to death, the legal system
concluded that there was no evidence of innocence sufficient to stop the executions. For those who
were exonerated, the system determined there was sufficient evidence of innocence to require that the
defendants be cleared and released.").
96 Harmon and Lofquist compared the innocent (wrongly convicted) to the innocent (wrongly
executed). Harmon & Lofquist, supra note 26. Garrett explicitly disavowed any knowledge about
whether the convicted defendants in his comparison sample were either innocent or guilty. Garrett,
supra note 6, at 61.
97 Gross & O'Brien, supra note 26, at 952-57.




One of the criticisms of matched comparison samples is that they identify a
set of common factors that distinguish categories of cases from each other without
necessarily identifying a root cause(s) for the different outcomes. In the Gross and
O'Brien study, for example, we know that the exonerated were more likely to be
tried for crimes against children than were defendants accurately convicted of
capital crimes, but it would be folly to say that a child victim "caused" the
wrongful conviction. What Gross and O'Brien show, instead, is an association, or
correlation, between case characteristics and case outcomes. Indeed, the
association is even less predictive when researchers use, as Gross and O'Brien
have, a chi-square test of correlation, rather than seeking to conduct a regression
that offers more informative inferential statistics.
As one of us previously wrote, social scientists distinguish between the
concepts of correlation and causation, the former suggesting that two events are
linked, and the latter concluding that no other factor could "explain away" the
ability of one event to lead to the other.99 A classic example is racial profiling,
where researchers have uncovered disproportionate patterns of police stopping or
citing minority motorists, but police groups argue that other acceptable indicators
of criminality justify their behavior.'0°
The causation/correlation distinction in criminal cases has created difficulty
for the courts. Consider, especially, McCleskey v. Kemp,10 in which the Court was
asked to consider a meticulous quantitative study of capital punishment in Georgia.
Led by University of Iowa law professor David Baldus, a research team found that
the murderers of white victims were four times more likely to be sentenced to
death than were the killers of African Americans. 10 2  Yet, despite the courts'
willingness to premise liability in other contexts on disparate impact, 10 3 neither the
Eleventh Circuit nor the Supreme Court considered these disparities--on an issue
that literally involved the distinction between life and death-as violative of the
Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. As Justice Powell said
for the Court, "[Statistics cannot] prove that race enters into any capital sentencing
decisions or that race was a factor in McCleskey's particular case [emphasis in the
original]. . . .At most, the Baldus study indicates a discrepancy that appears to
correlate with race." °4
99 GOULD, supra note 12, at 128.
1oo See generally STEVEN J. MUFFLER, RACIAL PROFILING: ISSUES, DATA AND ANALYSES
(2006).
10' 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
102 Id. at 286-87.
103 In the area of employment discrimination, policies that may appear neutral on their face but
that have a disproportionate, negative impact on workers of one race or gender are constitutionally
suspect. See generally Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
'04 Id. at 308, 312.
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The Court has been justly criticized for its failure to comprehend statistics in
McCleskey,10 5 but its correlation/causation distinction is, nonetheless, relevant in
examining the nature of wrongful convictions. Rather than using matched samples
to compare case characteristics and outcomes, researchers might employ
contingency or path analysis to distinguish between the sources of wrongful
convictions. Path analysis is more generally understood as a decision tree. One
begins with an initial condition regarding a case and then traces the possible
progression of that case through competing scenarios. A true path analysis can
stretch for pages, but for present purposes, consider an example that one of us has
previously offered concerning eyewitness identification in cases of stranger
rape. 0 6 This analysis offers only a few paths of a possible scenario, for there
obviously are numerous potential outcomes from this tree, depending on the
specific facts of the individual case.
Stranger Rape and Eyewitness Identification.
Q1: Did the victim see the perpetrator?
A,: No. Unlikely that she will later be able to identify him.
A2: Yes. Continue to next query.
Q2: Does the victim remember the perpetrator's depiction and
believe she can identify him?
A,: No. Unlikely that she will later be able to identify him.
A2: Yes. Continue to next query.
Q3: Was a composite sketch drawn?
A,: No. Potentially more difficult to catch a perpetrator or for
the victim to identify a suspect later. Explore why the sketch was
not made.
Q4: Did officers provide photos of potential suspects for the
victim to observe?
A,: No. Potentially more difficult to catch a perpetrator.
Explore why no photos were provided.
A2: Yes. Continue to next query.
Q5: How were the photos presented?
A,: Simultaneously and/or with feedback. Identification may
be more likely yet less accurate. Risk of wrongful conviction rises.
Continue to next query.
A2: Sequentially without feedback. Any identification is
likely to be more accurate. Continue to next query.
Q6: Did the victim identify a perpetrator from the photos?
105 A law clerk from that term, Edward Lazarus, has lambasted the justices in his 1999 book,
Closed Chambers: The First Eyewitness Account of the Epic Struggles Inside the Supreme Court.
According to Lazarus, Baldus' findings left little explanation for the disparity in capital sentencing
other than racial animus on the part of jurors or prosecutors.
106 GoULD, supra note 12, at 129-30.
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A1: No. More difficult to catch the perpetrator.
A 2 : Yes. Continue to next query.
Q7: How certain was the victim in her identification?
A,: Certain. Continue to next query.
A2: Doubtful. May continue to the next query depending on
officers' judgment. Officers may discount the identification, search
for additional evidence to corroborate the identification, or pursue
the suspect identified. The risk of wrongful conviction rises if
officers lock onto a suspect to the exclusion of others when
identifications are weak or doubtful.
Q8: Was the suspect stopped/seized?
A1 : No. Case remains unsolved.
A 2 : Yes. Continue to next query.
Q9: Do law enforcement officers believe the suspect matches
the victim's earlier description, identification, or composite sketch?
A1 : Yes. Arrest and charge are likely.
A2: No. Move to next query.
Q10: If law enforcement officers have doubts about the
connection between the suspect and the prior depiction/sketch, do
they act on those doubts?
A1 : No. Officers may arrest and charge the suspect, arrest and
hold him while seeking corroborating evidence, or arrest the suspect
and leave the charging decision to the prosecutor. The risk of
wrongful conviction rises when officers arrest and charge suspects
whose guilt they doubt.
A 2 : Yes. Depending on the depths of the officers' doubts and
their willingness to intercede, they may release the suspect and
pursue other potential perpetrators or wait to charge the suspect
while seeking corroborating evidence. In either case, the risk of
wrongful conviction is ameliorated.
10 7
This example is just one of the many possible paths a criminal investigation
might take. In some cases, a composite sketch may be too vague to assist in
catching the perpetrator, and in others the victim may be so certain of the suspect's
identity that neither a mug shot nor a sketch is necessary. The point is not that this
particular analysis applies to every case but instead to illustrate the process of path
analysis, which can help researchers to understand why cases conclude as they do.
Other parts of a case should be analyzed like this as well, for collectively the
process of custodial interrogations, the work of defense attorneys, and even the
decisions of prosecutors to open their case files all serve to raise or reduce the risk
of a wrongful conviction. °8 For example, if detectives or prosecutors wait to seek
107 Id.
'o' Id. at 131.
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corroborating evidence, they may refrain from relying too heavily on a flawed
identification process. Similarly, a questionable confession may be challenged and
discounted if defense counsels are able to discover inconsistent facts in the
prosecutor's files.
V. CONCLUSION
This article has used the empirical study of wrongful conviction to address the
question of what criminal law and criminal procedure scholars can learn from
criminology and social science. The lessons, we believe, are primarily
methodological. We have argued that most scholarship on wrongful conviction-
which, in recent years, has been overwhelmingly written by law professors and
legal scholars-has been primarily descriptive and has relied almost exclusively on
a narrative case-study method to illustrate the traditional legal causes of wrongful
conviction and to propose policy reforms. As we have seen, the narrative method
of legal scholarship oversimplifies the multifactorial, complex, and contingent
nature of causation in wrongful conviction cases. It also tends to elevate individual
factors over institutional ones, omit alternative hypotheses or explanations, repeat
old findings with new stories, and simplify the larger systemic context of wrongful
convictions. Criminologists, as well as a few non-traditional legal scholars, have
used social science methods to provide insights into the phenomena of wrongful
conviction that go beyond what can be learned only through a narrative case study
methodology. We have discussed and illustrated the use of three such approaches
in this article: aggregated case studies, matched comparison samples, and path
analysis.
Although we have argued that the lessons from criminology and social
science for legal wrongful conviction scholarship are primarily methodological, we
end on a more substantive point. In their recent study of the systematic differences
between a sample of exonerations and a sample of executions in capital cases,
Gross and O'Brien decry "our pervasive ignorance" about the empirical study of
wrongful conviction: "Our main message is gloomy," they write. "We do not
know much about false convictions, and it will be difficult to learn more."' 9 We
disagree. The empirical study of wrongful convictions of the innocent in America
is almost a century old,110 and there are now more than one-thousand documented
cases of wrongful conviction."' There have been hundreds of studies, in one form
or another, 1 2 of these wrongful conviction cases, and there have also been
109 Gross & O'Brien, supra note 26, at 958.
110 See supra notes at 6-10 and accompanying text.
IIl JAY ROBERT NASH, I AM INNOCENT!: A COMPREHENSIVE ENCYCLOPEDIC HISTORY OF THE
WORLD'S WRONGLY CONVICTED PERSONS (2008).
112 One of us has argued elsewhere that the field or scholarship on wrongful conviction is
divided into three genres, the big picture studies of wrongful convictions, narrative non-fiction
studies of wrongful conviction cases, and the specialized social scientific literature on the causes and
consequences of wrongful conviction. See Leo, supra note 22.
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thousands of empirical studies on the traditional legal causes of wrongful
conviction, especially eyewitness misidentification" 3 and police-induced false
confession.114
Although Gross and O'Brien correctly point out, as have many other scholars
before them," 5 that the frequency of wrongful convictions is unknown and
unknowable, it is not necessary to know the incidence or prevalence of a
phenomenon to study it empirically or scientifically. Virtually every aspect of the
study of American crime and criminal justice contains some incomplete or missing
information. Scholars need not exaggerate the significance of the "dark figure" of
wrongful conviction or the implications of imperfect knowledge or the absence of
pristine pre-existing data sets. In this age of 24/7 media coverage, electronic
media and scholarly databases, specialized websites and blogs, Lexis, Westlaw and
Google, advanced internet search engines, and innocence projects and innocence
commissions, there is no shortage of public information about wrongful
convictions in America. Moreover, the hundreds of DNA and non-DNA
exonerations in the last two decades have provided wrongful conviction scholars
with more-and more easily accessible-primary and secondary source data than
ever before. In short, the data on wrongful convictions is there to be discovered,
documented, and analyzed. We have argued in this article that more systematic
and sophisticated research strategies are necessary to analyze the data in ways that
will lead to more precise, more complete, and more generalizable knowledge about
the causes, characteristics and consequences of wrongful convictions.
Our disagreement with Gross and O'Brien's "gloomy message" is not merely
an academic matter. Wrongful convictions cry out for reform and prevention. It
bears remembering that there is no worse routine error in the American criminal
justice system-that the criminal justice system itself causes-than the wrongful
conviction of a factually innocent person. There is no worse error, period, in the
criminal justice system than the wrongful execution of a factually innocent person,
which numerous scholars and activists believe has already occurred many times
over in the United States.1 6 We need more and better research methods in the
13 See, e.g., Wells et al., supra note 67. See also JAMES M. DOYLE, TRUE WITNESS: Cops,
COURTS, SCIENCE, AND THE BATTLE AGAINST MISIDENTIFICATION (2005).
114 See, e.g., RICHARD A. LEO, POLICE INTERROGATION AND AMERICAN JUSTICE (2008); see also
GISLI H. GUDJONSSON, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERROGATIONS AND CONFESSIONS: A HANDBOOK
(2003).
15 Bedau & Radelet, supra note 10, at 26-27; Leo & Ofshe, supra note 74.
116 Bedau & Radelet, supra note 10, at 73 (arguing that twenty-three innocent individuals were
wrongly convicted and wrongly executed in America from 1900-1985). See HELEN PREJEAN, THE
DEATH OF INNOCENTS: AN EYEWrrNESS ACCOUNT OF WRONGFUL EXECUTIONS (2005) (arguing that
Dobie Gillis Williams and Joseph Roger O'Dell were wrongly executed); Hugo Bedau et al., supra
note 35, at 598 (arguing that a twenty-fourth innocent person, Jessie Tafero, was executed in 1994);
Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, The Truth About False Confessions and Advocacy Scholarship,
37 CRiM. L. BULL. 293, 316-28 (2001) (arguing that Barry Lee Fairchild was wrongly executed);
William S. Lofquist & Talia R. Harmon, Fatal Errors: Compelling Claims of Executions of the
Innocent in the Post-Furman Era, in WRONGFUL CONVICTION: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON
2009]
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legal study of wrongful convictions not only to improve the discourse in our
scholarship, but also to provide policy-makers with better information to improve
the quality of American justice.
MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE 93-115 (C. Ronald Huff & Martin Killias eds., 2008) (arguing that fifteen
executed individuals were almost certainly innocent); Mandy Welch & Richard Burr, The Politics of
Finality and the Execution of the Innocent: The Case of Gary Graham, in MACHINERY OF DEATH:
THE REALITY OF AMERICA'S DEATH PENALTY REGIME 127-43 (David R. Dow & Mark Dow eds.,
2002) (arguing that Gary Graham was wrongly convicted and executed).
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